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Transmission of Mastery
JAMES A. GARDNER†
ABSTRACT
James A. Garfield, speaking of the legendary professor
and longtime president of Williams College, Mark Hopkins,
reputedly remarked, “The ideal college is Mark Hopkins on
one end of a log and a student on the other.” This
longstanding ideal—a highly talented teacher deeply
engaged with a student—has been eclipsed in our time by a
bureaucratic conception of education characterized by
prescriptive curricula; standardized constraints on teacher
discretion, such as rubrics; and continual assessment, not
only of students but of professors, no matter how talented. In
this paper, I defend the “Mark Hopkins model” as the only
conceivable way to produce the transmission of mastery from
master to novice.
†Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor of Law and Research
Professor of Political Science, University at Buffalo Law School, The State
University of New York. This paper was written for a conference in honor of my
colleague Jack Schlegel, entitled “Serious Fun: A Conference around and with
Schlegel!” In my thirty years in the academy, I have never encountered a more
thoughtful and engaged interlocutor on the subject of teaching. The ideas
presented here were inspired by a two-decade, ongoing conversation with
Schlegel, and I offer this paper with humble gratitude, in honor of those
conversations. I also thank my colleague Bert Westbrook, who organized the
conference, for providing me the opportunity to reflect at length on the subject. I
additionally thank Herb Gardner, Jane Gardner, and Jay Mootz for comments on
an earlier draft, and Dan Caves for valuable research assistance.
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To do so, I make the following claims: (1) only masters
are capable of judging mastery; (2) masters are those and
only those who either are acknowledged as masters by other
masters or who self-claim mastery; (3) virtually nothing can
be said a priori about the content of mastery in any domain,
nor can its content be fully articulated, even by masters; (4)
the only way to transmit mastery is via the teaching of a
master, and which methods of doing so most effectively
cannot be determined a priori; (5) masterful teaching
involves discarding preconceived lesson plans as often as it
does sticking to them; (6) the variability of assessment from
master to master or even by a single master assessing the
same or different students at different times does not in any
way impugn the validity of their judgments; (7) the most
reliable method of evaluating mastery consists of the
consensus of multiple masters expressed over a period of
time in a transcript; (8) the essence of masterful teaching
consists of the perpetually repeated deployment of trial and
error, meaning that the content and methods of successful
transmission of mastery can never be prescribed in advance;
(9) there is no such thing as mastery of “teaching,” tout court;
there is only mastery of teaching something; and (10) the
modern move toward prescription and assessment results
not from the discovery of better and more reliable ways of
transmitting mastery, but from the abandonment altogether
of transmitting mastery as a goal of education; its actual goal
has become the mass reproduction of basic competence.
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“The ideal college is Mark Hopkins on one end of a log
and a student on the other.”
—

James A. Garfield, speaking of the legendary
professor and longtime president (1836-1872) of
Williams College1

“The dean and the faculty of a law school shall conduct
ongoing evaluation of the law school’s program of legal
education, learning outcomes, and assessment
methods; and shall use the results of this evaluation
to determine the degree of student attainment of
competency in the learning outcomes and to make
appropriate changes to improve the curriculum.”
—

American
Bar
Association
Accreditation Standard 315

Law

School

MASTERY
1
Here is my claim: “I am an outstanding lawyer.”
Am I not?
Well? I’m waiting.
2
Who is capable of evaluating such a claim? Clearly, only
an outstanding lawyer can evaluate this claim—a master of
the practice of lawyering. By definition, only a master is
capable of judging mastery.

1. FREDERICK RUDOLPH, MARK HOPKINS AND THE LOG: WILLIAMS COLLEGE,
1836-1872 vii (1956). In another version of the story, Garfield said: “A pine bench
with Mark Hopkins at one end of it and me at the other is a good enough college.”
LEVERETT WILSON SPRING, A HISTORY OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE 210 (1917); see also
id. at 211, n.1. The version with the log appears to have passed into the general
lore. RUDOLPH, supra, at vii-viii.
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Might another high-performing professional—a doctor,
say—be able to judge the mastery of a lawyer? No. Some
years ago, I saw an oral surgeon. While the surgeon was
examining me, he admired the work of my dentist—”She
does good work, doesn’t she?,” he said. I mumbled, “Yes, she
does,” but I knew very well I had no way of judging the
validity of his claim, though it was very nice indeed to hear
this validation from another practitioner of oral medicine.
Can a client judge the mastery of his own lawyer? No.
Clients may develop hunches, but without legal training,
they lack the ability to evaluate the quality of the legal work
they purchase. This is precisely why clients are not
permitted to direct the legal and tactical decisions of
lawyers.2
Can a well-informed student—a senior apprentice, say—
judge mastery? No. Such a person may be able to distinguish
competence from incompetence, and may even be able to
distinguish among degrees of moderate competence, but
because his understanding of the practice to which he is
apprenticed is by definition incomplete, he is not in a position
to distinguish mastery from mere competence.
What about an experienced practitioner who, despite his
experience, nevertheless lacks mastery? Although his
opinion is not uninformed, he too is in no position to judge
the mastery of others. A useful piece of social science
research, known as the Dunning-Kruger Effect, has
demonstrated the obvious: people of low competence, because
they are unable to perceive the performative difference
between competence and incompetence, cannot even perceive
their own incompetence, and thus frequently judge
themselves to be far more competent than they are.3 This
2. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.2(a) cmt. 2 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 1983); N.Y.
Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.2(e) (2009).
3. David Dunning, et al., Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own
Incompetence, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 83 (2003); David Dunning,
The Dunning-Kruger Effect: On Being Ignorant of One’s Own Ignorance, in 44
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 247 (2011).
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disqualifies them from perceiving competence in others,
much less mastery.
3
If only masters can judge mastery, who, then, is a
master? There are two and only two possibilities: (1) those so
acknowledged by other masters; and (2) self-proclaimed
masters.
In our society, we have to a great extent institutionalized
the identification of mastery through the creation and
distribution of formal trappings of acknowledgment: degrees,
certificates, testimonials, inductions into guilds, and so forth.
Whether such methods in fact successfully identify true
masters is a question I shall set aside here. But even
assuming these modes of acknowledgment are accurate, they
do not exhaust the universe of possibilities because
individuals
who
lack
the
formal
trappings
of
acknowledgment may also claim mastery.
A dozen years ago, The New Yorker published an
illuminating account of how a system of self-proclaimed
masters may operate in practice.4 In the early 2000s,
automobiles were relatively scarce in China, yet with only
three percent of the world’s autos, China accounted for more
than twenty percent of its accidents. In this “nation of new
drivers,”5 understanding of safe driving practices was scarce,
and eventually, the Chinese government began to require
driver training as a condition of licensure.
This suggests a high degree of standardization, but much depends
on the instructor, who is called a jiaolian, or “coach.” Often, coaches
have developed their own theories and regimens, like the martialarts masters of old. Wei Ziqi’s coach . . . forced his students to begin

4. Peter Hessler, Wheels of Fortune: The People’s Republic Learns to Drive,
THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 19, 2007, at 104.
5. Id. at 108.
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every maneuver in second gear. It was more challenging, he said;
first gear would only make them lazy.6

In one driving dojo,
[t]he students spent ten days on the parking range, and during that
time they performed exactly three movements: a ninety-degree turn
into a parking spot, the same maneuver in reverse, and parallel
parking. Every day, for as many as six hours, they practiced these
turns over and over. Like any good martial-arts master, Coach Tang
was strict. “You must have forgotten your brain today!” he yelled,
when a student brushed against a pole. “Don’t hold the gearshift
loosely like that!” he shouted at another. “If you do, your father will
curse you!”7

In the school of another driving jiaolian, the students’ final
challenge was
the “single-plank bridge”—a concrete riser, a foot high and only
slightly wider than a tire. Students had to aim the car perfectly, so
that two wheels perched atop the riser . . . . If a single wheel slipped,
they failed the exam. The students spent most of their ten days
practicing the single-plank bridge, and I asked a coach why it was
so important. “Because it’s very difficult,” he said.8

Systems of mastery by self-proclamation also exist in the
United States. Masters of philately and numismatics
generally self-proclaim, as do masters of horse-breeding, hair
styling, and cosmetology, though sometimes these
occupations require a license, a form of official validation of
competence, though perhaps not of mastery. Self-taught
amateurs sometimes proclaim themselves masters—in the
field of history, for example—without the advanced study
and formal trappings of consensus recognition, though of
course such recognition may be, and sometimes is obtained
informally, through testimonials of recognized masters.
But regardless of whether mastery is acknowledged by
consensus or self-proclaimed, the status of master may be
obtained exclusively through a process that is circular and
6. Id. at 110–11.
7. Id. at 111.
8. Id. at 112.
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self-referential: because only masters are capable of judging
mastery, the population of masters may be identified only by
masters themselves. The insularity of this process
sometimes creates, understandably enough, a degree of
discomfort and suspicion among outsiders to the practice, a
subject to which I will return.
4
Of what, then, does mastery consist? Surprisingly little
can be said.
First, mastery is domain specific. There is no such thing
as “mastery” tout court; there is only mastery of a specific
domain. Consequently, generalizations about mastery are
possible only at a level of abstraction so high as to be useless,
if not indeed entirely circular—something on the order of “a
master is one who has mastered the elements of his practice,”
for example.
Second, mastery itself is highly variable. Even within a
single domain, there is no fixed set of attributes that
comprise mastery. Rather, mastery is more like a portfolio of
knowledge, skills, and attributes that may be held in
different combinations, provided that the total value of the
portfolio, so to speak, surpasses some threshold. As a result,
the content of mastery can differ from master to master, and
may even be contested among masters who hold different
kinds of portfolios, or who simply hold different conceptions
of the practice of which they are acknowledged to be masters.
Third, mastery is a continuous journey, not a
destination. As a master’s mastery increases, the content of
his mastery necessarily changes and evolves. Moreover,
masters, like other humans, change over time. Insight may
arrive, even to masters, at any time. My own belief is that
insight arrives whenever a person adventitiously becomes
ready to receive it, and that different kinds of insight thus
arrive at different chronological ages, and following the
accumulation of different kinds of life experiences. Yet a latearriving insight does not impugn the truth or value of earlier-
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arriving insights; it merely underscores the fundamental
fluidity of mastery, which is, after all, a human condition.
Fourth, mastery is by definition contextually responsive,
so what counts as a masterful performance may change over
time, as external conditions change. I have taught
Constitutional Law for thirty years, and in that course I
always try to teach my students how to construct and deliver
good constitutional arguments. But what counted as good
constitutional advocacy when I started, in the age of
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, no longer counted as
good advocacy later, in the age of Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas, much less in the age of Roberts, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh. Thus, the content and methods of masterful
constitutional argument evolve, as does mastery of the art of
constitutional advocacy.
5
Still, even if the content of mastery changes over time,
within a given period can its content nevertheless be
captured and catalogued in a book or a manual, perhaps? No.
For all the reasons just mentioned, the content of
mastery is (i) variable, (ii) continually evolving, and (iii)
contextual. These considerations erect significant and
perhaps decisive obstacles to the full capture of mastery even
in a snapshot valid only during the period in which it is
taken.
More importantly, it seems to me that at any given
moment not even a master himself is capable of articulating
fully the content of his own mastery, even if he were inclined
to do so. First, not even the most experienced master has
encountered all possible problems and challenges, and so
does not yet know the masterful response to these as-yet
unencountered circumstances, even though he is likely
capable of handling them masterfully should they arise. This
helps explain a common aspect of the phenomenology of
mastery: masters tend to be keenly aware of how little they
know.
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Second and more fundamentally, the master does not
know everything he knows, or at least is unable to articulate
it using the language of the mastered domain.9 For many
years, I taught pretrial federal civil litigation. In that class,
I required my students to develop legal arguments and write
them in the form of briefs. Usually, students would make
sound arguments, but occasionally, a student would make an
argument that was frivolous, and thus forbidden under rules
of professional ethics—a serious violation. When I would
inform students that their arguments were frivolous, they
often replied, with complete sincerity, “But it seems like a
good argument to me.” I always found these moments
uncomfortable because it is impossible to explain
meaningfully to a student who doesn’t already see the
frivolity of his argument why and in precisely what way it
crosses the line from legitimate to frivolous. “Trust me,” was
about all I could say; “it’s a matter of professional judgment;
no judge would ever accept that argument.” “But why not?,”
the student would ask. What possible answer can one make
to such a question? “When you acquire some experience,” I
would respond, unhelpfully though truthfully, “you will
understand why.”
Finally, to put the matter differently, what does it mean
for a master to tell a student, “I’ve taught you everything I
know”? Can we take this literally? Surely not. The master
does not know when he has truly exhausted his stock of
knowledge. Such a statement means only that, in the expert
judgment of the master, more time spent with the master
will not be as fruitful a use of the student’s time as time spent

9. It is immaterial to my point, but this may be merely an example of Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorem, which holds that no system is capable of fully justifying
itself. See, e.g., PANU RAATIKAINEN, GÖDEL’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS, THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed., Fall Edition
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/goedel-incompleteness
/. Or, for another view of the impossibility of fully articulating knowledge of a
practice, see Jack Sammons, Confronting the Three Apprenticeships, in TOWARD
HUMAN FLOURISHING: CHARACTER, PRACTICAL WISDOM, AND PROFESSIONAL
FORMATION (Mark L. Jones, et al., eds., 2013).
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practicing in the domain studied. In these circumstances, the
master cannot know precisely what the student will learn in
practice. Instead, he merely relies on the knowledge that
novices may learn things in ways other than from a master’s
instruction, and the master does not know in any individual
case what these things are, or perhaps he would teach them
himself.
6
Although the content of mastery is impossible fully to
articulate, we can nevertheless say this much: mastery is—
indeed, must be—something distinct from what I shall call
“basic competence.” Consider again the example of teaching
driving. Formula One race drivers and professional stunt
drivers do not teach driving to 16-year-olds. If they teach
driving at all, presumably they teach race and stunt driving.
This suggests that those who teach driving to teenagers in
the United States are not themselves masters of the practice
of driving. Nevertheless, they are good enough for the
purpose for which they have been engaged. Evidently, they
possess basic competence in driving, which is what they
transmit to their students, and is by definition all they are
capable of transmitting. I shall return to this issue.
TRANSMISSION OF MASTERY
7
How is mastery transmitted? By the teaching of a
master, and in no other way.
Is it possible for mastery to be taught by a non-master?
No, by definition. Non-masters cannot transmit mastery
because, lacking mastery themselves, it is not theirs to
transmit.
What if the non-master has in his possession a
curriculum developed by a master, along with, say, a
“rubric”—a grid or checklist directing a non-master
instructor what to look for and precisely how to reward it?
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Such tools can certainly help the novice advance. But can
they so elevate the game of a non-master that he or she
becomes able to transmit mastery itself? No. Those who are
not masters cannot recognize mastery, and those who are
incapable of recognizing its presence or absence cannot
therefore inculcate it. Since progress toward the
achievement of mastery is something that can be judged only
by a master, the question of how to move any given student
forward, toward mastery, is something that can be judged
only by a master, in that moment.
Modern theories of teaching stress testing,10 but testing
has no necessary relationship to mastery, except perhaps
mastery of test-taking. When I was studying for the bar, my
review materials contained practice bar exams. Once, my
mother asked if she could take a practice exam. She had
never studied law, and had no interest in doing so—she was
an English teacher. She did, however, possess an exceedingly
sharp mind and a certain genius for taking tests. When she
took the practice bar exam, without so much as glancing at
the substantive study materials, she got about half the
questions right—nearly a passing grade. This did not make
her a master of legal practice. It did not even demonstrate
that she knew any law. It did, however, illustrate what all
law professors know: that the bar exam tests little having to
do with good lawyering. It tests good test-taking, a practice
of which my mother was, and remains, a master.
I do not wish to disparage tests. Administering a test is
one way—indeed, a traditional and quite properly respected
way—in which a master may judge a student’s progress
toward mastery. But so is simple observation, and especially
observation over an extended period of time, in different
conditions that require different tasks and responses. I have
often found it puzzling that clinicians, who have far more
meaningful opportunities than any other law faculty to
observe their students’ actual, professional performance, are
10. E.g., BARBARA E. WALVOORD, ASSESSMENT CLEAR AND SIMPLE 13 (2004).
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among the most heavily invested in formal, rigid methods of
assessment.11
8
I have said that mastery can be transmitted only by
masters. But is it possible to say more? Is it possible to say,
for example, that mastery can be transmitted by masters, or
can be transmitted most effectively by masters, only when
they employ some specific method of instruction—for
example, only when they employ “formative” rather than
merely “summative” forms of assessment?12 No. If the
content of mastery itself cannot be fully captured, then a
fortiori neither can the conditions or methods of its successful
transmission.
9
This brings us to Mark Hopkins on a log. What is meant
by holding up this image as the very model—indeed, the
acme13—of effective pedagogy?
Nineteenth-century college professors taught principally
by “[l]ectures, meticulous grading of classroom recitations,
and memorization.”14 Hopkins was guided by a different
philosophy. He preferred to “watch the progress of individual
mind, and awaken interest, and answer objections, and

11. E.g., Amy L. Ziegler, Developing a System of Evaluation in Clinical Legal
Teaching, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 575 (1992); José García Añón, How Do We Assess in
Clinical Legal Education? A Reflection on “Reflective” Learning, 23 INT’L J.
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 48 (2016).
12. KAY BURKE, BALANCED ASSESSMENT: FROM FORMATIVE TO SUMMATIVE, 21,
23 (2010); ROY STUCKEY, ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION
AND A ROADMAP 236ff (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 164–67 (2007).
13. See RUDOLPH, supra note 1, at vii (Garfield’s remarks “came to be looked
upon by many as the most satisfactory definition of what an American college
ought to be”).
14. Id. at 52–53.
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explore tendencies.”15 To accomplish these goals, he varied
his methods of instruction. He often asked “keen,
stimulating, instructive questions”16 to generate discussion,
and—shockingly for his era—sometimes asked students
what they themselves thought.17 Here is a recollection of one
of his students a half-century after the fact:
“‘I rang the bell Senior year at the end of the hour,’” said a member
of the class of 1862, “and sat near the door in the recitation room
back of the new chapel and quite on the left of the President. One
day he turned half about in his chair, looked inquiringly and
expectantly at me, and asked a question. I have no idea what that
question was or what answer I gave, but the incident made an
impression upon me which the intervening years—there are fiftythree of them—have not obliterated.”18

Above all, Hopkins’s purpose differed from that of most of his
contemporaries: “The purpose of it all, the end in view, was
not primarily to communicate knowledge, but to set his
students ‘intellectually on fire.’”19
When I imagine Mark Hopkins on a log, I imagine a
master of his craft approaching the instructional task with a
stock of knowledge and experience, and some well-earned
and carefully formulated ideas about how to proceed, but
willing, and indeed expecting, to improvise—willing and
expecting, that is, to tailor both his topics and his methods of
instruction to the immediate needs of his students,
diagnosed on the spot. I imagine a teacher not committed in
advance to any particular curriculum or methodology, but

15. Id. at 48.
16. SPRING, supra note 1, at 225.
17. See RUDOLPH, supra note 1, at 50.
18. SPRING, supra note 1, at 223–24 (quoting letter of Rev. E.E. Lewis).
19. Id. at 223. This approach seems to have come to be well understood as one
used intuitively by the best teachers. See KEN BAIN, WHAT THE BEST COLLEGE
TEACHERS DO 99 (2004) (“[T]he best teachers try to create a natural critical
learning environment; ‘natural’ because students encounter the skills, habits,
attitudes, and information they are trying to learn embedded in questions and
tasks they find fascinating—authentic tasks that arouse curiosity and become
intrinsically interesting.”).
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committed instead only to deploying whatever curriculum
and instructional methodology will, in that moment, best
serve the goal of moving the student a few steps further
toward mastery—and if not toward mastery, then at least
toward the development of an internal hunger for mastery,
which will itself motivate the student to proceed further,
even outside the presence of the master.
A “rubric,” on this account—a fixed template for teaching
a subject—is precisely the definition of bad teaching because
it represents a rigid and necessarily speculative prediction of
what will profit a student most at a particular moment in his
or her path toward mastery. This is not to say that good
teaching does not require a great deal of preliminary
groundwork and preparation; clearly, it does. But
preparation alone will not suffice. The teacher needs to
teach—not merely to recite, like an automaton—and effective
teaching often, and perhaps frequently, means throwing out
the script rather than sticking to it as the actual needs of
actual students come gradually into view.
Here is an example from personal experience. I’m
teaching Lujan, an important standing case, in
Constitutional Law. The test for Article III standing has two
causation elements.20 Causation is something that my
students have already covered extensively last semester in
Torts. In questioning students about the facts of the case, it
becomes clear to me (how? by what means?) that my students
don’t know how to tell a convincing causation story—that is,
they do not know how to select and shape the facts to build a
persuasive story in which X causes (or fails to cause) Y. The
ability to construct and relate such stories is, in my
judgment, a critical lawyering skill. Do I: (a) ignore the
problem, because teaching causation isn’t part of the
Constitutional Law curriculum, and they should have
20. A typical formulation is: “A plaintiff must allege [1] personal injury [2]
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
Elements 2 and 3 require a causation analysis.
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already learned it; (b) continue without addressing the
problem because the costs to my coverage goals will exceed
the benefits to the students; or (c) stop the class, ditch my
lesson plan, and teach the subject because they need to know
it if they are to master the craft of lawyering?
What would Mark Hopkins do on his log? I believe he
would throw out his lesson plan, which is what I almost
always do in these circumstances. Is that bad teaching? It is
not.
10
Of what, then, does masterful transmission of mastery
consist? I contend it comprises two essential elements: (1)
sound, perceptive diagnosis of the problems a novice faces at
some particular moment, and (2) administration of a
thoughtful and carefully tailored cure for those problems.
Neither the problems nor the most effective cures can always
be predicted in advance.21
My father is a retired music teacher, and a bit of a legend
among his former students. He can teach any instrument,
but his specialty is strings. In his retirement, he has taken
on the role of consultant to some of his former students who
are now themselves string teachers. They bring him their
most challenging problems. He diagnoses these problems,
and then devotes considerable time to writing short, original
compositions designed to mount a direct attack on the
student’s weakness. On one occasion, for example, he
diagnosed a student’s problem as insufficient independence
of the fingers of the left hand. To treat this problem, he wrote
a composition—not a dull, repetitive exercise, but a coherent,
albeit simple piece of music of the kind that a child might
21. It is possible of course that periodically circumstances align in a way that
makes it easy to predict the problems incoming students will appear with, as well
as the best treatment for those problems. At other times, though—for example,
as one cohort is replaced by another with different characteristics—predictability
may decline, perhaps greatly. Thus, the ability to predict student problems and
identify “best practices” to treat them is variable, local, and entirely contextual.
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actually wish to master—that required the student
periodically to play broken thirds, a figure that can be played
only when the fingers of the left hand operate with a great
degree of independence. Mark Hopkins, I am certain, would
have approved.
11
One of the great objections leveled by the assessment
movement at the conception of transmission of mastery I
have just sketched is its variability. Different students, it is
claimed, performing equivalently, will nevertheless be
evaluated differently by different masters, or even by the
same master at different times. This is said to show the
“subjectivity”—a concept used in this context pejoratively—
of traditional methods of transmission of mastery22—the
Mark Hopkins method, let us call it. Suppose the charge is
true: evaluation of students is subjective and variable. Does
this demonstrate a defect in the Mark Hopkins model? It
does not.
As explained earlier, mastery is not a steady state. First
and foremost, masters are human. Second, true mastery
itself inevitably evolves as the master himself continues to
acquire new knowledge and experiences—mastery is a
journey, not a destination—so that different students who
appear before the master at different times will inevitably
receive slightly different instruction and slightly different
evaluation by slightly different criteria. The more pertinent
question is whether variability in assessment from student
to student during essentially the same period impugns the
master’s claim to be able successfully to judge the
performance of novices. Yet is there any alternative? No
human being can apply precisely the same standards in

22. See, e.g., MARY E. MCDONALD, SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LEARNING
OUTCOMES: DEVELOPING MULTIPLE-CHOICE EXAMS 10 (2002); Jessica Clark &
Christy DeSanctis, Toward a Unified Grading Vocabulary: Using Rubrics in
Legal Writing Courses, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC 3, 3 (2013).
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precisely the same way in every set of circumstances, over
and over and over again.
The great cure for this problem of human inconsistency,
according to what appears to be a theory with many
adherents among professional educators, is the rubric—a
standard metric which the teacher produces and proceeds to
apply mechanically—and thus, it is maintained,
impartially—to the work of each and every student.23 This is
a foul lie. I confess that, in occasional moments of doubt
about my own ability to evaluate student work consistently,
I have developed and administered rubrics. Here is what I
always find: when I use a rubric, I cheat—constantly. It will
often happen like this. I read an exam answer. The author
has checked many or even all of the pre-programmed boxes—
spotted the issue, deployed the correct test, noticed and
addressed a key fact, and so forth. Yet, on scoring the exam,
I am troubled: the execution is poor, say, revealing that the
student does not really—not really—know what he or she is
doing. That is, I cannot say with any degree of comfort that
the student’s answer proceeds from actual mastery, from
mere dumb luck, or from some combination. At the same
time, another student has done a masterful job of addressing
a portion of the problem, but failed to address, or to address
adequately, other issues I have identified in my rubric and to
which I have assigned point totals.
There is only one way to handle this: I cheat. I find a way
to take points off the bad exam in some category of my rubric
just because the exam is bad; and to give points to the good
exam, just because it is good. I find myself inventing “bonus
points” that I had not previously planned to award. I fully
believe, moreover, that instructors who do not cheat in this

23. See Clark & DeSanctis, supra note 22; BARBARA E. WALVOORD & VIRGINIA
JOHNSON ANDERSON, EFFECTIVE GRADING: A TOOL FOR LEARNING AND ASSESSMENT
IN COLLEGE 40, 42–44 (2d ed. 2010); see also DANELLE D. STEVENS & ANTONIA LEVI,
INTRODUCTION TO RUBRICS 4 (2005) (“One sure sign [you need a rubric] is if . . .
[y]ou have graded all your papers and worry that the last ones were graded
slightly differently from the first ones.”).
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way—who stick fanatically to the rubric in the belief that it
forces them to be fair in ways of which they are otherwise
incapable—do so only by willfully ignoring what their own
professional judgment tells them is true.
The real question, then, isn’t whether judgment can be
made invariable—it cannot—but how to deal with questions
raised by the mass production of education. This is the real
point of the “assessment movement,” a subject to which I
shall return. The “problem” here has little to do with
education; it has only to do with how to resolve tradeoffs
required by its mass production—and by the suspicion of
outsiders arising from the insularity of any practice.
12
One frequently employed response to these problems is
to give an “objective” exam—a multiple choice exam, say.24
The scoring of such an exam is automatic, depriving the
teacher of any and all discretion; indeed, the scoring can be
outsourced to a machine, guaranteeing its consistency and
thus impartiality.25 The scoring, moreover, is transparent,
and thus is easily explained to outsiders who may be
suspicious of the subjectivity of the master’s methods of
evaluation and the self-referential character of their
disciplinary validation.
But such an exam is not any less “subjective” or even
“variable” than an essay, oral, or performance exam—the
subjectivity and variability simply occur on a longer time
scale. A multiple choice test given one year may demand
different answers or performances than one given the next
year. All that is different is that the “subjectivity” and
potential “variability” occur only once, at the time the test is
made, rather than occurring repeatedly with each student.
But if each student is subject to exactly the same standard of
24. See MCDONALD, supra note 22, at 67. A multiple choice exam is “objective,”
on this view, because “subjective judgment is not involved in scoring them.” Id.
25. This is said to be an aspect of a test’s “reliability.” Id. at 152.
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judgment of mastery, it does not follow that the quality of the
judgment is better. The test itself might be badly flawed, so
that every student is judged equivalently and impartially by
a flawed, and thus meaningless, standard. It is far from
certain that all masters would even agree on which is the
best answer to all the questions asked. This is precisely why
I never assign commercially prepared study aids to my firstyear students; sometimes I disagree with the analyses
provided by the authors.
If in contrast the master had given each student
individually a lengthy oral examination, the master’s
judgment might have varied from day to day and from
student to student, but all students would have received an
evaluation that was fundamentally sound, even if not
precisely identical—an important distinction that seems to
be widely ignored in the educational literature. A multiple
choice test is therefore more consistent, but not necessarily
better. Again, Exhibit A is the bar exam itself, which no
doubt is applied consistently from taker to taker, but has
achieved this consistency only at the cost of sacrificing
evaluation of any skills that are actually relevant to the
successful practice of law. Moreover, the construction of a
test like the bar exam requires a special skill that is
generally completely divorced from the kind of mastery that
the master claims, and in which he instructs, and in the
acquisition of which it is far from clear he should invest.
All this goes a long way toward demonstrating why the
best way to evaluate students is (1) by consensus (2) over a
long period of time. Since mastery itself can most reliably be
identified and acknowledged by consensus among experts
employing the conventions of their field, the same is true of
evaluating the performance of novices. Thus, the overall
judgment of an entire faculty over the course of a student’s
academic career, expressed in a transcript, is by far the best
way to provide an accurate evaluation of the student’s level
of mastery. I am always concerned when students who, on
the basis of their class performance, I think well of then do
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poorly on my exam. But I am much more concerned when
students who are, by consensus of my colleagues, excellent
students do poorly on my exams.
I am inclined to think, moreover, that when students are
subjected to the judgment of many masters over long periods
of time, it matters very little what method or standards of
evaluation are used—everything will even out in the long
run; the student’s progress will be accurately gauged.
Indeed, over decades of experimentation with different forms
of examination and evaluation, I have found exactly this:
regardless of the format, the students almost invariably
manage to distribute themselves normally, with the best
students at the top and the worst at the bottom. And at the
end of the day, if the collective judgment of an entire faculty
of masters will not suffice to judge accurately a student’s
acquisition of mastery, then nothing will.
TEACHING
13
To this point, I have simply assumed that masters teach,
and that they do so masterfully, but I want now to introduce
a complication. What, precisely, is good teaching a
demonstration of? What kind of mastery does it display? I see
four possibilities.
First good teaching might be an inherent aspect of
mastery itself. That is, mastery of a practice includes by
hypothesis mastery of the practice of reproducing mastery.
Consequently, all masters can teach.
Second, good teaching might demonstrate a kind of
specialized mastery, though a kind that still falls within the
practice domain mastered. In this case, some but not all
masters can teach; one can practice mastery without being
able effectively to replicate it.
A third possibility is that good teaching demonstrates a
kind of superior mastery of the relevant domain. Thus, all
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true masters can teach, and teaching is something reserved
for the best of the best. This is, I suspect, how many
university professors conceive of teaching, and why they are
so often concerned with educational pedigree, the theory
evidently being that graduation from, say, an Ivy League
dojo, rather than one maintained by a state university,
validates a claim of superior mastery.
Finally, good teaching might demonstrate a distinct
mastery of a wholly different domain—the domain of
teaching—in addition to mastery of the domain in which
instruction is given. Mastery in this case does not imply
replication; to transmit mastery to others, the master must
learn, and ultimately achieve mastery of, a different domain.
This is the claim made by education “specialists,” a class of
individuals, produced mainly by university schools of
education, who proclaim themselves masters of “teaching”
tout court—that is, teaching divorced from any particular
field of mastery that they purport to transmit.
14
What, if anything, does the achievement of mastery
teach the master about teaching mastery? In a sense, not
much. The master of course knows how he himself acquired
mastery. But surely there are many different paths to
mastery, in part because studying under different masters
may require treading different paths, but also because
individual differences from student to student may mean
simply that no two novices follow precisely the same path to
mastery even when they study side by side under the same
master. Consequently, it is possible that a master’s ability to
lead another along precisely the path to mastery that he
himself has trod may be of limited value.
But is that the only kind of knowledge of the route to
mastery that the achievement of mastery confers? Perhaps
not. The achievement of any kind of mastery necessarily
entails knowledge of what it means to understand something
fully. Such knowledge is rare; few people achieve mastery of
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anything, and thus have never known the sensation—for
that is what it is, a sensation—of profound understanding.
Perhaps this kind of knowledge—an understanding of
understanding—by itself equips the master to teach others
because it puts him in a position to recognize the presence or
absence of true understanding in others. Every master
knows his own path to mastery, but assuming he is not
entirely without imagination, surely he can imagine, at least
within limits, how the path might be altered to suit another.
Furthermore, the achievement of mastery may
inherently require great skill at learning itself, and selfdirected learning, at that. As a result, masters may be able
to master other domains more easily than those who have
never achieved mastery in any domain. Suppose, then, that
successful teaching of a practice that one has mastered
requires learning either a new aspect of the mastered
domain, or even an entirely distinct domain—the domain of
teaching. In those cases, perhaps masters may be able to
learn to teach their own subject—perhaps nearly any
subject—very quickly, and then go on learning, again
relatively quickly, to teach it well.
These appear to be assumptions made almost
universally in educational institutions. Law schools in
particular seem to take the view that virtually any faculty
member can teach virtually any course. As a first-year law
student, I had the pleasure of taking Contracts from Antonin
Scalia, who was an entertaining and jocular teacher, but his
primary field of expertise was administrative law, and in
retrospect, I doubt he knew much at all about contracts. The
law school administration, however, seemed to think that
any teacher who was good at teaching his own subject would
be good enough at teaching any other subject, at least in the
first-year curriculum.
This is probably true, but for different reasons, I suspect,
from those that lay behind the decision of the University of
Chicago Law School to assign Professor Scalia to teach
Contracts. The dirty little secret is that when professors take
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on new courses, they actually teach the same course they
have always taught, though the students don’t know it. I’m
sure students who have taken Constitutional Law from me
believe they have had a different course from those who have
taken my Civil Procedure course. But I know otherwise; the
courses are identical in the ways that really matter.
15
When masters endeavor to transmit their mastery, they
generally get better at it with practice and experience. What
should we make of that?
I have suggested that true teaching, of the kind that
counts as transmission of mastery, consists essentially of two
elements: diagnosis and treatment. As masters gain
experience, surely their diagnostic skills improve.
Eventually, they’ve seen it all before, or much of it. Patterns
emerge in student difficulties, and the master begins to sense
the patterns. Similarly, as the master gains experience
administering treatments, he becomes more adept at
choosing and administering them.
Of course, the dominant patterns of diagnosis and
treatment can and do change over time. As any experienced
teacher knows, different student cohorts arrive with
different kinds of problems. As a result, the content and
methods of successful transmission of mastery are never
static. Still, experience helps—but experience doing what?
I contend that what experience in the transmission of
mastery confers upon masters is simply this: more
experience with trial and error, and indeed that masterful
teaching is neither more nor less than that—the continual
deployment of trial and error for the purpose of moving
novices toward mastery.
This explains why only a master can transmit mastery.
Anyone stuck in front of a classroom can use trial and error
to teach, but a master’s trial and error is informed—by
domain-specific mastery itself, and by the judgment and
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experience that accompany it. Indeed, a master who fails
constantly to employ methods of trial and error becomes
stale, and mastery that is static decays. Thus, the apogee of
good teaching is precisely informed, experienced trial and
error tailored to the immediate needs of individual
students—Mark Hopkins on a log.
16
But what about masters who teach badly? What does this
phenomenon tell us about the transmission of mastery? In
particular, does bad teaching impugn a master’s claim to
mastery?
If mastery of a subject necessarily embraces the capacity
to teach it, then of course bad teaching impugns the bad
teacher’s claim to mastery. But it seems to me dubious that
mastery of a practice necessarily implies a fortiori to any
great extent mastery of its replication. On the other hand, if
mastery implies an advanced ability to learn how to transmit
that mastery to others through teaching—which seems to me
quite plausible—what then does persistently bad teaching
over many years imply?
One possibility, clearly, is a lack of underlying mastery.26
Among teachers of writing it is widely accepted that the most
common cause of bad writing is bad thinking. On the same
principle, a possible cause of bad teaching—teaching that is
confusing or disorganized—is simply thinking that is
correspondingly confused or disorganized, a condition largely
incompatible with a plausible claim to mastery. Yet I think
this situation is probably quite rare.
A more common explanation, it seems to me, is that
some masters—a very small number, I believe—either lack
interest altogether in developing their skill as teachers of
26. See Gary Shaw, A Heretical View of Teaching: A Contrarian Looks at
Teaching, the Carnegie Report, and Best Practices, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1239 (2012)
(attributing criticism of the Socratic method to incompetent use of that method
by poor teachers).

2021]

TRANSMISSION OF MASTERY

79

and mentors to novices or, more likely, don’t care to invest
their effort in transmitting their mastery to every student
who appears on their doorstep. Some masters, for example,
may wish to train only the best and most promising students.
Such a choice raises two questions. First, do masters
have an obligation to train all students? In traditional
systems of apprenticeship, masters were not obliged to train
all comers; they could select their own apprentices based on
whatever criteria they chose to apply. Some masters, we may
assume, chose to accept only the most promising and highly
motivated students. In the modern university (assuming it
to be a place populated by masters), the obligations of
mastery are different: virtually all faculty must teach
whatever students the university deems eligible to register
for their courses, and the expectation is that masters will
devote an appropriate amount of effort to all students,
whatever their aptitude.
Second, if the obligations of mastery do include
mentoring all students diligently, does the failure to do so
impugn the master’s claim to mastery? I believe it does to a
certain extent insofar as a master who refuses to fulfill this
obligation displays what I consider a lack of self-mastery; he
is unable to force himself to fulfill his obligations as a master.
Can one who lacks self-mastery nevertheless plausibly claim
mastery of his practice? I am dubious; self-mastery seems to
me a fundamental prerequisite to the achievement of
genuine mastery.
Many years ago, I studied taekwondo at a pioneering
dojo in Washington, D.C. The students were of all ages, and
some of the younger students wanted to be instructed in the
use of weapons. In that dojo, the study of weapons was
forbidden until a student had attained the degree of black
belt. The head instructor explained it in this way: “A weapon
is merely an extension of your body. Until you have mastered
your own body, you cannot possibly master the use of a
weapon. A black belt recognizes mastery of the body, so you
cannot study weapons until you earn your black belt.” I am
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inclined to think this reasoning relevant to any kind of
mastery: mastery of the self is a precondition to mastery of a
practice—any practice.27 Thus, masters who choose
deliberately not to cultivate and then to exercise their
teaching skills in challenging situations—if such creatures
exist—display, in my view, a lack of self-mastery that calls
into question to some degree their underlying mastery.
17
Is there such a thing as mastery of teaching, as distinct
from mastery of teaching something? This appears to be the
claim made by schools of education that train primary and
secondary school teachers.28 Indeed, it appears to be the
claim made almost universally by state regulators. For the
most part, one cannot be licensed to teach at a public school
by producing a degree showing mastery of a subject that
teachers teach in schools—an advanced degree in history, for
example, or mathematics. Instead, one must produce two
things: a bachelor’s degree—by no means a demonstration of
domain-specific mastery—and a credential from a school or
department of education, a credential that appears to claim
that its holder is a master simply of “teaching.”29

27. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, THE DEATH OF CHARACTER: MORAL
EDUCATION IN AN AGE WITHOUT GOOD OR EVIL 16, 56 (2000).
28. For example, the Harvard Graduate School of Education describes itself
as “an impact-focused professional school that is working to improve
opportunities and outcomes for all learners.” HARV. GRADUATE SCH. of EDUC.,
https://www.gse.harvard.edu/about. The Stanford Graduate School of Education
is dedicated to achieving effective learning for all. STAN. GRADUATE SCH. of EDUC.,
https://ed.stanford.edu/about. Graduates of the University of Wisconsin School of
Education are committed to high-quality, culturally responsive instruction that
serves
every
student.
UNIV.
of
WISCONSIN
SCH.
of
EDUC.,
https://tec.education.wisc.edu/become-a-teacher/. Its courses “will prepare you to
be a competent, critically reflective educator.” UNIV. of WISCONSIN SCH. of EDUC.,
supra.
29. For example, to be certified as a teacher in California, one must hold a
bachelor’s degree and complete an approved “teacher preparation program. Such
a program contains educational curriculum.” ALL EDUC. SCHS.,
https://www.alleducationschools.com/teacher-certification/california/.
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If teaching in primary and secondary schools is meant to
produce the transmission of mastery, then the present
credentialing system is fatally flawed since it does not
require teachers to be masters of the practices in which they
instruct students. There is, however, another possibility:
primary and secondary schools are not, nor are they intended
to be, venues for the transmission and acquisition of mastery.
Instead, they are meant to be venues for the transmission
and acquisition of basic competence. If so, then the main
qualification for a faculty position in such a school is simply
to be an adult in possession of basic competence. It is
presumably in this context that a degree in “teaching,”
rather than in teaching a specific practice or domain, is
claimed to have meaning.
Is it meaningful? Perhaps. Masters devote significant
time, effort, and excruciatingly close attention to the
acquisition and cultivation of mastery. Perhaps the
acquisition of basic competence is different. Its possessors
may not know how they acquired it, or even when. Having
had no particular need to reflect upon their own basic
competence, they may lack a clear idea of in what it consists.
Having never been part of a system created deliberately to
replicate a very high level of competence, they may be largely
unacquainted with the means by which facility in a practice
is transmitted.
It is perhaps in these circumstances that the kind of
instruction offered in schools of education may be useful,
along with standardized teaching aids such as textbooks,
commercially produced lesson plans, rubrics, off-the-shelf
tests, and other products devised by masters for use by nonmasters.
ASSESSMENT
18
All educators, at every level, whatever their prior
experience, and whether they like it or not, now inhabit the
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Empire of Assessment. In this vast realm, Mark Hopkins and
his log are out. In his place is a regime of constant
assessment, both of student learning and institutional
success, in which the instruments of assessment must
produce results that are susceptible to counting, a practice
that is considered the exclusive source of objective evidence
of achievement.30 Dimensions of achievement not susceptible
to evaluation by counting are deemed excessively subjective
and are exiled.
The ascendance of the Empire of Assessment results
from the confluence of several trends. One is a vague
suspicion, to which I alluded earlier, understandable in a
democratic society, about the closed, self-referential nature
of mastery.31 Another is a perfectly understandable concern
with public finances and an accompanying worry about
whether the public is getting adequate value from its
investment in public education.32 But by and large, the main
reason for the rapid victory and expansion of the Empire of
Assessment is the equally rapid emergence and consolidation
of a social commitment to specialize (as it were) in the mass
production of basic competence, in all domains.

30. E.g., Lee. S. Shulman, Counting and Recounting: Assessment and the
Quest for Accountability, 39 CHANGE: THE MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING 20, 24
(2007).
31. See generally, Alfred S. Konefsky & Barry Sullivan, In This, the Winter of
our Discontent: Legal Practice, Legal Education, and the Culture of Distrust, 62
BUFF. L. REV. 659, 738 (2014). Perhaps the quintessential expression of such a
view is the 1995 antitrust lawsuit filed by the U.S. Department of Justice against
the American Bar Association charging that “‘legal educators have captured the
ABA’s law school accreditation process.’” BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW
SCHOOLS 11 (Chicago Series in L. and Soc’y 2012) (quoting from the District Court
opinion). For a delightful critique of this critique, see Steven Hales, Who’s
Assessing the Assessors’ Assessors?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 11, 2013),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/whos-assessing-the-assessors-assessors/.
32. See CHRIS W. GALLAGHER, RECLAIMING ASSESSMENT: A BETTER
ALTERNATIVE TO THE ACCOUNTABILITY AGENDA 19-28 (Heinemann 2007); MICHAEL
F. MIDDAUGH, PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
DEMONSTRATING INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 109–32 (Jossey-Bass 2010);
GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 19–21 (Instit. for
L. Sch. Teaching 2000).
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We see this commitment in, for example, the recently
discovered truth that everyone must have a university
education,33 and indeed that a university education is a
human right.34 We see it also in the extremely successful
efforts by the business community to shift the costs of job
training from economic actors to the system of higher
education, where the bill for training future workers in basic
employability is paid by the public. Firms thus unnecessarily
raise their credentialing requirements for entry-level jobs to
include a university degree, creating a system in which
university graduates are de facto unable to enter the world
of work unless universities provide the training in basic
employment competence that employers once understood to
be their own responsibility.35
Even in law, which, like other professions, was long
considered a practice demanding mastery rather than basic
competence, a move to mass training in basic competence is
openly advocated by enthusiasts of artificial intelligence and
automated, do-it-yourself enterprises like Legal Zoom.
According to these prognosticators, whom I have no good
reason to doubt, the future of the profession is one of two
tiers: “bespoke” work for those who can pay and who have a
great deal at stake; and basic professional competence for
everyone else.36

33. President Obama was a strong advocate of this idea. See Doug Lederman
& Paul Fain, The Higher Education President, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/19/assessing-president-obamasfar-reaching-impact-higher-education.
34. See Heidi R. Gilchrist, Higher Education. as a Human Right, 17 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 645, 647 (2018).
35. See Doug Lederman, Credential Creep Confirmed, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/09/demanddegrees-grows-many-fields-havent-required-them.
36. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF-FULL: THE DECLINE
LEGAL PROFESSION 6–9, 85–103 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
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Where, then, does that leave us? It appears to leave us
with a system in which basically competent people transmit
basic competence. Mastery is dropped as superfluous, or
perhaps is reclassified as a luxury item restricted to those
who can pay for it.
Because mastery is no longer its goal, the education
industry devotes ever-increasing effort to figuring out how to
make the mass transmission of basic competence more costefficient—through distance learning,37 for example, or
MOOCs.38 Or through the cheap assembly of a faculty of
permanent, itinerant adjuncts,39 because a permanent
faculty of masters has an obstreperous habit of wanting to
transmit what it knows as though it had some kind of value.
Or by dismantling the very idea of a “faculty” as an
institution, much less as one charged with designing and
implementing a curriculum.40 And if these innovations not
only de-institutionalize the transmission of mastery but also,
as a collateral consequence, dumb down even prevailing
conceptions of what counts as basic competence, at least the
result, however characterized, is delivered at a reasonable
price.
Where does all this leave the community of selfproclaimed and self-validating masters? As my colleague
Jack Schlegel, struggling with the same questions, has put
it, perhaps all such a community can do is to “dress for
dinner”—that is, to maintain with dignity its quaint and

37. See STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROC. FOR APPROVAL OF L. SCHS. § 306 (AM.
BAR. ASS’N 2019).
38. A MOOC is a “massive open online course.” See, e.g., Laura Pappano, The
Year of the MOOC, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/
2012/11/04/education/edlife/massive-open-online-courses-are-multiplying-at-arapid-pace.html.
39. FRANK DONOGHUE, THE LAST PROFESSORS: THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY
FATE OF THE HUMANITIES 56–60 (Fordham Univ. Press 2008).
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40. Id. at 55–83.
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obsolete rituals and practices until the masters and
practitioners comprising the community are no longer able;
until, that is, we complete the transition to a post-Sisyphean
world in which “gravity gets not just the rock but also the
pusher.”41

41. John Henry Schlegel, To Dress for Dinner: Teaching Law in a
Bureaucratic Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 479 (2018).

